Pantex Guards Said Using Grenade Launchers with No Darkness Sights
Cox News Service
Thursday, July 19, 2007
WASHINGTON — Guards responsible for protecting the Pantex nuclear weapons plant near Amarillo, Texas, have been armed with grenade launchers that are not equipped with reduced-visibility sighting systems, a private nonprofit watchdog group said Wednesday.
In order to fire the weapon at night, guards use a hand-held night vision device, then lay it aside and fire the weapon, a document identified as a draft report by investigators from the Energy Department Office of Inspector General.
Moreover, it says investigators were told that Pantex guards have not been trained in firing the weapons, known as MK-19 grenade launchers, at moving targets.
The document was made public by the Project on Government Oversight (POGO).
"At our most sensitive facility in the nuclear weapons complex, the security officers wouldn't know what the heck they were shooting at if there was an attack at night," said POGO investigator Peter Stockton.
The Pantex plant is 17 miles northeast of Amarillo, Texas. It is responsible for maintaining nuclear warheads and dismantling the weapons when they are taken out of service.
Spokespeople for the Energy Department and BWXT Pantex, the contractor that operates the warhead plant, declined to respond allegations contained in the document.
A spokeswoman for the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Energy Department agency that operates the country's nuclear weapons sites, questioned its authenticity.
"If it does exist, I don't know if we have even received this report through the official IG report process," Smith said in an e-mail. "Thus, it is hard for me to comment on something that says 'draft' and doesn't even looked finished."
Labeled "Draft Inspection Report," the document is printed in the format used by inspectors general throughout the government. Space near the end, where agency officials normally comment on the findings of a draft report, is left blank.
The document states that investigators were told by some Pantex guards that they could not accurately fire the weapon at night, even though it was deployed for use at any time of day.
"A contractor official initially stated that, due to competing U.S. military priorities, reduced visibility sights that had been ordered were not anticipated to be delivered for nearly one-and-one-half years after deployment of the weapon," the document states.
Besides using the weapon during darkness or in other impaired visibility situations, guards are supposed to be able to use it against a "maneuvering adversary," the document says. But interviews with officials and a review of the site's training course found that guards were only given basic training at a firing range in daylight — not in engaging an enemy in reduced visibility, at extended distances or against a moving target.
In a second document, also released by POGO, Inspector General Gregory Friedman said investigators had found that during a recent strike by Pantex security guards, BWXT had certified the proficiency of "contingency" guards, despite their having failed tests.
"Certain students provided incorrect answers to questions, while other students circled more than one multiple-choice option for questions," Friedman said in a memo to other Energy Department officials.
These students received "immediate follow-up and tutoring," he said, adding that "once the students demonstrated an acceptable level of subject knowledge and competence, they were considered to have passed the examination."
In some cases, he said, students were discussing the course and using printed course material while other students were taking the test — in the same room. Instructors were "in and out of the classroom" during this time, he said.
Founded in 1981, POGO conducts investigations and issues reports on national security, government contracting, environmental and other issues. Government documents it has made public have consistently proven authentic.
In 1996 and 1997, POGO exposed the failure of national oil companies to pay royalties on oil removed from government lands.
In 2002, it revealed that large government contractors that had paid more than $3.4 billion in fines and restitution for misconduct but were never disbarred from doing business with the government.
A 2000 POGO report on an Air Force's lease of aircraft from Boeing Corp. led to the resignation of the company's CEO and conviction of a top Air Force procurement official on influence-peddling charges.